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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THE NEW YORK TIMES RULE: JUDICIAL OVERKILL
LEWIS C. GREEN't
I. THE New York Times RULE
THE New York Times' case immunizes from liability one who pub-
lishes false and defamatory statements about a public official. From
the New York Times opinion, it is possible to draw three qualifications
to this rule:
1. In its original form, the rule applied only to one who holds
public office.2
2. The Court further stated that the immunity was available only if
the defamatory statement related to the official conduct of the plaintiff.'
3. Finally, the Court stated that the immunity would be lost if the
defamatory statement was published with "actual malice - that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.' 4
To date, all three of these qualifications appear to be ill-fated.
The rule has been widely extended to a great variety of public em-
ployees, appointed as well as elected, such as police officers and deputy
sheriffs,5 and a case pending in the Supreme Court seeks to extend it
to the football coach at a state university.' Moreover, the rule has even
been extended to persons who are not government officials or employees.
It has been applied to candidates for office as well as incumbents,7 the
t Member of the Missouri Bar. A.B., Harvard University, 1947, LL.B., 1950.
I have been asked to present a commentary on New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), from the point of view of the plaintiff's attorney. I qualify
for this assignment because I represent the plaintiff in a pending case involving this
issue (Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966),
Petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WECK 3143 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1966) (No. 522).)
However, I am largely disqualified for the same reason, for it appears that considera-
tions of ethics impose considerable restraint in commenting upon a pending case in
which I am counsel of record. A similar restraint is probably in order respecting
General Walker's cases, in one of which I was formerly counsel of record (on the de-
fense side). [ed. - Certiorari was denied in the Pauling case, 87 Sup. Ct. 2097 (1967).]
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 282-83.
3. Id. at 273, 279, 282-83.
4. Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
5. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (seinble) ; Pape v. Time,
Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966) (deputy chief of
detectives and police lieutenant) ; Thompson v. St. Amant, 184 So. 2d 314 (La. App.
1966) (deputy sheriff) ; Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
6. Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
385 U.S. 811 (1966).
7. See, e.g., State v. Browne, 86 N.J. Super. 217, 206 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1965)
Block v. Benton, 44 Misc. 2d 1053, 255 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. 1964).
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partner in the law firm of a public official,' and persons of prominence
who have spoken out on matters of public concern.9 The end of this
extension is not yet in sight.
It is hard to imagine what kind of libel will be held by the Court
not to relate to the official conduct of the public official. By hypothesis,
the libelous publication will damage his reputation. Anything which
damages his reputation is likely, at least in the opinion of some people,
to reflect upon his fitness for an office of public trust. In short, it is to
be expected that this qualification will prove illusory."
The recent application of the New York Times rule to a right of
privacy case from the State of New York, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,"
appears to me to be of less significance. The privilege articulated in
that case is restricted by its terms to reports of newsworthy people or
events. Thus restricted, the privilege appears to afford little more pro-
tection -than the law generally affords outside of New York.' 2
II. EVALUATION
To evaluate the merits of the New York Times rule, it is necessary
to analyze what the new rule adds to and detracts from our society, and
determine how well the additions and subtractions balance.
The obvious loss under the new rule is the loss of the limited
protection which the libel laws have traditionally afforded to the indi-
vidual human being, the protection of his own individual human dignity
from the use by others of words, as Mr. Justice Fortas said, as "instru-
ments of aggression and personal assault."' 3 The individual who falls
within the target area of the New York Times rule is deprived of all
protection from false, defamatory insults which offend his sensibilities,
and damage his reputation in society. In short, if you are in the target
area, the Supreme Court has declared open season on you.
As to the right of privacy, if the generous application of the new
rule in Time, Inc. v. Hill is representative of its future, as it may well
8. Gilberg v. Gaffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. 1964), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965).
9. See Brief for Appellant, petition for cert., pp. 6-9, 13-16, Pauling v. Globe-
Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35
U.S.L. WEEK 3143 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1966) (No. 522).
10. I feel constrained to withhold comment on the development of the third
qualification, "actual malice." My views are set forth in part in the Pauling petition
for certiorari, especially at pages 6-9, 13-16. For a thoughtful pre-Pauling comment,
see Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 596-600 (1964).
11. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
12. See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAMS, TORTS § 9.7 at 688 (1956) ; RESTAtMENT, TORTS§ 867, comment c (1939). But cf. PROSsga, TORTS § 112 at 848-49 (3d ed. 1964). The
application of the rule to the facts of the case seems questionable, however.
13. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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be, then the individual has lost further protection from verbal assault
upon ,the fundamental right of privacy.
What has been added to society can be simply, if argumentatively,
stated: False, defamatory insults have been added to the merchandise
offered to the public in the market place of ideas. Under the peculiar
facts of the Hill case, where truth would have been a defense even under
New York law, further wares have been added to the New York market
place: False statements offensive to the sensibility and privacy of the
individual.
What has been lost, on the other hand, seems to me to be an essen-
tial part of the personal dignity of -the individual human being. This is
an interest which merits high ranking on our scale of social values. In
the final analysis, it is the basis of our Declaration of Independence and
Bill of Rights.
When the gains and losses are thus balanced, it is easy to reach
a conclusion. I respectfully submit that false statements add little that
is beneficial to the market place of ideas.' 4 And, even more clearly,
false verbal assaults upon another person, rather than comments upon
issues of public importance, are of little value to society. In short, I
suggest that the new rule eradicates a very valuable element in our
society, and adds little in return.
Of course, I have stated the supposed values of the new rule in
only a limited way. It may be argued that the justification for the
New York Times rule is not simply the value of the false, libelous state-
ments themselves, but 'the creation of a "breathing space,"" an atmos-
phere in which critics will feel complete, "uninhibited . . . wide open
[freedom to make] vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp,"16 and libelous attacks on other persons, without undue concern
for accuracy and truth, and w.ithout fear of retribution in case of error.
In short, those persons who are inclined to argue by way of insult and
personal attack should feel "uninhibited [and] wide open." As I under-
stand this argument, society is supposed to benefit from personal and
defamatory abuse, even though a part or all of it is false. The argument
is not very persuasive, for two reasons.
14. Mr. Justice Brennan cites Mill and Milton in support of the proposition that
a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate,
since it brings about "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced
by its collision with error." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
n.19 (1964). But this proposition, to the extent that it has any validity, depends upon
an effective debate; it has little relevance to the massive power of the press, arrayed
against the lone voice of an individual person. And it may be doubted whether Mill
and Milton would find a valuable contribution in a defamatory, personal insult.
15. Id. at 272.
16. Id. at 270.
[VOL. 12: p. 725
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First, the personal insult, even when it is not false, has limited
value, if any, in a free social order. After all, -the market place that we
cherish is the market place of ideas, of discussion of public issues and
events, not the market place of ad hominem attacks diverting attention
from the issues.
17
Second, I suggest that a vehement, caustic, defamatory attack upon
another's person is a serious business. It is not entirely unreasonable
that the attacker should feel some little restraint, that he should take the
trouble to find out whether he has his facts straight, before he attacks
the person who disagrees with him. That is what the law of libel is all
about, and has been for generations. I submit that the public would
be better informed by a smaller number of truthful libels than a larger
number of false ones, and society would benefit thereby.
The "breathing space" argument does have some merit because it
points up -the real, fundamental danger in the New York Times rule,
and in its extension to "public figures," in terms of the values of free
speech. It seems probable that the new rule will have a more repressive
effect upon free speech (and upon much more valuable speech) than did
the old rule. As Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California,
"those who won our independence believed ...public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American Government."'" Under the new rule, one who recognizes this
responsibility and plays a responsible part in our society automatically
enters the .target area created by the New York Times rule. In effect,
this new rule would limit the freedom of speech of citizens of high
attainment, on matters of public concern, by exposing them to libel
without redress. Those persons best qualified to add something of value
to the market place of ideas will be constrained by fear of irresponsible
ad hominem attacks. The result is an expansion of freedom to libel at
the expense of freedom of speech.' 9
III. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court is at its best when it proceeds with caution
and deliberation, shaping its rulings precisely to meet the needs clearly
presented. Great constitutional pronouncements are occasionally called
for. Witness, for example, the segregation cases and the reapportion-
17. Of course, a publication may make a newsworthy comment on a public issue
while insulting an individual - e.g., a statement that the county treasurer has em-
bezzled the county's funds. But a personal attack upon an individual, simply for the
sake of discrediting him, merely diverts attention from the merits of the public issues
which should be freely discussed.
18. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion).
19. See Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 106, 119 (1965). See also Barron, Access to the
Press, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1657 (1967).
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ment cases. But fundamental constitutional changes are best wrought
when they are forged to meet an urgent, deeply felt, -firmly established
need, which can be met in no other way. The history of mis-govern-
ment which brought on the segregation cases and the reapportionment
cases illustrates the kind of need which justifies such changes.
By these standards, how does the ruling of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan measure up? Clearly the decision of the Alabama Supreme
Court was properly reversed; we could not tolerate this kind of penalty
for the -type of publication involved. And it cannot ibe said that the case
was entirely an isolated one. There were more or less related cases in
the southern courts, and the subsequent judgment in the case of General
Walker demonstrates that the need went beyond the New York Times
case.
However, I do not think it can be said that we had suffered from
a half-century of mis-government resulting from fundamental inade-
quacies in our libel laws. On the contrary, our libel laws had worked
reasonably well for more than a century and a half. Admittedly, the
law of libel is complex, but I am not aware of any extensive history of
grossly excessive and repressive judgments, or of extensive restraints
upon the exercise of the privilege of free speech, arising out of the
libel laws. Mr. Seelman2 ° tells us that, in recent years, there has been
an epidemic of outrageous awards of punitive damages for libel,
throughout the nation and particularly in New York. It is not clear
that other authorities share this view, or that it would withstand
analysis in the light of newspaper revenue increases and devaluation of
the dollar. In any event, even Mr. Seelman admits that the appellate
courts kept a firm hand on these awards, and reduced them drastically.
Thus, if such a problem did exist outside of the South, it was apparently
adequately controlled by the appellate courts.
The problem presented in the New York Times case, and in -the
related cases, was a recent development, an outgrowth of the bitter
aftermath of -the segregation cases. The judgment in the New York
Times case was not proof of a fundamental inadequacy of the law of
libel; it was simply a breakdown of the judicial process in certain
southern states, similar to the breakdown in the enforcement of certain
aspects of -the criminal law in those same states. The acquittal of the
murderer of a civil rights worker does not demonstrate that the law
of murder needs drastic revision; rather it shows that the judicial
process is not working properly, at the particular time and place, in that
kind of case.
20. See Seelman, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 1965, p. 1, col. 6.
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Of course, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court had to
be reversed, just as a pesky gnat must occasionally be swatted. But I
submit that the Court failed us, in fashioning a nuclear blunderbuss
with which to swat a gnat. The Court could have met the need ef-
fectively, in any of several ways, without bringing to pass the unde-
sirable consequences noted above. For example, there would be no
significant loss to society if the Supreme Court would assert for itself
the power to set aside excessive damage awards in libel cases. Alter-
natively, the Court could, and in fact did,21 rule as a matter of federal
constitutional law that the publication did not libel Mr. Sullivan, because
it did not clearly charge him with the conduct in question. Nor would
it be a shock -to most of us to find that some or all of the traditional
libel defenses have been cloaked with the sanctity of the first amend-
ment. Thus, the Court would be able to, and almost did, dispose of
some parts of the publication by bringing the defense of substantial
truth within the protection guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments.22 No doubt other ways could have been found to reverse
that judgment without proclaiming such a far-reaching change in our
constitutional law. 23
In short, the need was for fair and adequate enforcement of our
libel laws, not for a new law of libel. The remedy selected by the Court
was not shaped to the need, and has already begun to produce unfor-
tunate results.
Is our society really a better place to live because the United States
Constitution protects Life magazine in its harassment of Mr. Hill and
his family ?21 Or because the Constitution guarantees to a sharp-tongued
columnist the privilege of falsely accusing an appointed County Park
Commissioner of embezzling public funds? 25 Or because the Constitu-
tion guarantees to a Nashville newspaper the privilege of running a
series of editorial attacks upon the Chairman of the Democratic Primary
Board, falsely charging him with fraud, false certifications, and illegal
manipulation of elections ?26
21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288-92 (1964).
22. See Id. at 289. Similar traditional defenses have been invoked, with some
plausibility, in the cases brought by General Walker.
23. Any of the alternatives suggested in the text would appear more effective
than the Court's actual ruling, in circumventing the apparent prejudice of southern
courts or juries. The New York Times rule (at least prior to Pauling) would
frequently leave the question of "actual malice" to the jury. Is there any doubt how
the New York Times or Walker juries would resolve that question?
24. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
25. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
26. See McNabb v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 400 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn.
App. 1965).
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Clearly "there are dangers in granting too much freedom to
modern communications media which sometimes lack a sense of
responsibility commensurate with their power. '"27 Ultimately, the New
York Times decision may be recognized as the unfortunate judicial
by-product of the reaction to the segregation cases, and may be severely
limited.
ADDENDUM
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker
were decided by the Supreme Court on June 12, 1967.a The Court has
indeed extended the New York Times rule to persons of prominence
who are not public officials. Nevertheless, two aspects of these decisions
suggest that the retreat from New York Times has already begun.
First, four members of the Court were unwilling to -so extend the
rule. Instead, they devised a new, and more moderate, rule: the publi-
cation is privileged if the defendant was guilty of "highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers."'
At first glance, the minority proposal seems eminently sensible.
It gives full protection where it is needed most - in the publication
of newsworthy writings, and particularly those furnished by third
parties, where the need for prompt publication precludes extensive
investigation, such as wire service news stories. Yet it requires a
reasonable degree of care in the magazine or editorial attack. The pro-
posal still leaves the crucial determination to a possibly prejudiced
jury, but the determination of the reasonableness of the publisher's
conduct is one more susceptible to judicial control on the facts than the
issue of the publisher's state of mind.
The four Justices who proposed the new rule were not a majority,
and one of them has since retired, but one may hope that their view will
prevail in time, and will indeed replace the Times rule in its application
to public officials.
Second, all but two members of the Court concluded that the evi-
dence would support a verdict in favor of Butts against the Saturday
Evening Post. Three Justices reached this conclusion by utilizing the
27. 1965 ANN. SURVIY AM. L. 422-23.
a. 87 Sup. Ct. 1975 (1967).
b. Id. at 1991.
[VOL. 12 : p. 725
7
Green: The New York Times Rule: Judicial Overkill
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
SUMMER 1967] PRESS, PRIVACY AND "PUBLIC" FIGURES 737
"actual malice" test of New York Times, and four by applying the new
rule supported by the minority, but both groups emphasized -the same
circumstances. The Post story on Butts was not "hot news," as was the
Walker story; there was opportunity to investigate; the investigation
made was grossly inadequate. And this is true even though the story
was supported by an affidavit.
This reaction of seven members of the Court suggests that, with
proper instructions, the Court may be willing to uphold a verdict for
the plaintiff somewhat more readily than might have been expected
prior to these decisions, at least in a case without substantial racial or
political overtones. It may be that the New York Times rule has
reached its crest, and will slowly recede to a rule which gives a fair
measure of recognition to the "need for vindication of honor."e
c. Id. at 1987.
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